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Decolonising Barclays Bank DCO? Corporate 
Africanisation in Nigeria 1945 –1969 
 
Abstract 
The reaction of British business to the decolonisation of the Empire has been the focus of 
much recent research, but few studies have shed light on the continued presence of 
commercial activities after independence. Barclays Bank DCO in Nigeria began 
indigenising its staff during decolonisation, but this process was far from complete at 
independence. African managers at Barclays were supposed to continue British banking 
traditions, while the post-colonial state hoped to gain more influence on foreign investment 
through the Nigerianisation of management. By the time the Nigerian civil war effectively 
ended in 1969 Barclays was only just beginning to come to terms with the ability and 
‘character’ of its Nigerian managers while the Nigerian state was moving towards more 
radical policies to control foreign business. This article aims to highlight the importance of 
Africanisation programmes for the structure and control of a major British bank trying to 
adapt first to the end of Empire and then to the post-colonial world. 
 
 
Nnamdi Azikiwe, the Nigerian nationalist and one-time banking entrepreneur, remarked in a 
speech in 1956 that combating financial monopolies and liberalising credit to Africans “would 
enable us to enjoy political freedom pari passu with economic freedom.” Similarly, a year after 
independence, Chief Awolowo, the leader of the Yoruba-based Action Group Party, stated that 
“[foreigners] control the bulk of our financial institutions”.i Political decolonisation had not 
remedied this state of affairs in the eyes of Nigerian politicians, but academic research 
continued to focus on politics and neglected the economic dimension of decolonisation and 
nationalism. Apart from a phase of radical ‘neo-imperial’ history in the 1970s and 1980s, which 
condemned African managers for having been ‘bought-off’ by capitalists, the questions of 
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economic decolonisation and the role of corporate Africanisation have usually been secondary 
to other lines of inquiry.  
Since the British National Archives opened their files on the end of Empire in the 1980s and 
1990s, research has continued to focus more on political and international aspects, for example 
Robert Robinson and William Roger Louis’s ‘The Imperialism of Decolonisation’ and John 
Darwin’s Britain and Decolonisation.ii This has also led to the publication of official files in the 
British Documents of the End of Empire Project. This includes a volume on Nigeria, edited by 
Martin Lynn, who, in a recent contribution to this journal, highlighted the role of a banking 
scandal that engulfed Azikiwe in stalling the decolonisation process between 1955 and 1957.
iii
 
Peter Cain and Antony Hopkins also asserted the importance of financial interests for the 
history of British imperialism in their contentious book of the same title.
iv
 However, with the 
opening of corporate archives, which occurred somewhat later, a number of studies on imperial 
business in West Africa have begun to emerge. While these have investigated the relationship 
between colony and business and the promotion of Africans to management positions, so far 
little attention has been paid to the role of the UK banks in Nigeria or any other British West 
African colony.  
These business studies fall into two fields: they have either a corporate or a national focus. 
David Fieldhouse’s work on the United Africa Company (UAC), a subsidiary of Unilever, 
details the rise and fall of this company as an Empire in its own right.
v
 Large sections of the 
book are devoted to metropolitan strategic thinking and its regional industrialisation efforts. 
While he addresses the question of Africanising or indigenising UAC’s local staff Fieldhouse’s 
approach remains firmly rooted in metropolitan thinking. However, this seems problematic, due 
to the potential for divergence in the thinking and decision-making of central and local 
management.  In the case of Barclays Bank DCO, the focus of this paper, while London Head 
Office could overrule or even replace local management, day-to-day practices on the ground 
were frequently inconsistent with London's directives and often subversive of them. Other 
studies focus on state-business relations within particular colonies, such as Sarah Stockwell’s 
work on the Gold Coast. In line with Nicholas White, who published extensively on British 
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companies in Malaya, she asserts a fundamental difference between UK firms and the colonial 
administration during decolonisation, and strongly rejects the argument that foreign business 
was unprepared for independence.
vi
  
This case study of Barclays in Nigeria underscores these findings but goes beyond 
decolonisation. Moreover, it benefits from a new accession at Barclays Group Archives, which 
had not previously been available to scholars. For British business, once it became clear that 
their time horizon was essentially different from that of the colonial administration – because 
they were not planning to leave West Africa– the necessity arose to collaborate with local elites. 
What shook British business, including DCO, to the core was not so much political 
independence, but the failure of the indigenous partners of the imperial transfer of power to 
maintain effective control over the emergent states. Unhappy with the lack of development, 
many African states, including Nigeria, turned on the remaining exponents of the former 
colonial connections, the expatriate companies, demanding economic decolonisation to match 
political developments. Some work has been conducted on post-independence nationalism and 
foreign business, for example by Nicholas White on independent Malaysia. However, for Africa 
the focus is still on the immediate effects of decolonisation on business, as shown in Robert 
Tignor’s comparative study of Egypt, Kenya and Nigeria. While Egypt is presented as a case of 
radical nationalisation of foreign assets, beginning with the Suez Canal Company, for Tignor 
Kenya provides an exponent of a business-friendly approach. He locates Nigeria in the middle 
of this spectrum, a mixed economy that increasingly blends politics and economics in 
institutions such as the marketing boards and various development efforts.
vii
 
Nigeria is an important case for the overall appreciation of post-colonial business, as it is the 
largest and potentially wealthiest economy not only in West Africa, but most of sub-Saharan 
Africa as well – with the exception of South Africa. The discovery of oil in the Niger delta in 
the late 1950s made it one of the few African countries that witnessed a substantial influx of 
private capital and investment beyond the long-standing business connections that dated from 
colonial times. With the coups in 1966 and the civil war that followed, political rule changed 
hands and forced imperial business to readjust. The resurgent nationalism that became evident 
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around 1968 opened up a new phase in the treatment of foreign investment, leading to the 
Nigerian Enterprise Promotion Decrees (NEPDs) of 1972 and 1977. The foremost study of this 
process is certainly Thomas Biersteker’s Multinationals, the state, and the control of the 
Nigerian economy, which presents a systemic view of the relations between the state and 
indigenous business as well as Lebanese and expatriate companies.
viii
  
Like most authors of the time, Biersteker focused on equity ownership of firms as a means to 
conceptualise control. The problems which occurred during the implementation of the NEPD 
legislation showed that such a narrow definition failed to encompass the more diverse character 
of control. Internal organisation and management were more significant than the identity of the 
firms’ owners.ix Thus, studies focusing exclusively on changes in equity ownership blank out 
the important factor of who is running the day-to-day management. In Margaret Ackrill and 
Leslie Hannah’s corporate history of Barclays the authors track the –often-involuntary– changes 
in equity ownership of local subsidiaries and highlight the related problems of control and fear 
for Barclays’s reputation. While the bank guarded its name and the spread eagle logo carefully, 
its Nigerian operations continued nevertheless under the name of Barclays Bank of Nigeria for 
three years after majority ownership had passed to the Nigerian state. However, when the last 
expatriate left the bank in 1979, London head office removed Barclays’s name from the 
resulting minority-owned bank. In 1989 Barclays divested the last 20 per cent of what was then 
called the Union Bank of Nigeria for commercial reasons.
x
 As this episode underlines, equity 
ownership, although undeniably significant, has been over-emphasised in the literature and 
other factors need to be taken into account when analysing control over foreign investment. 
The importance of Barclays Bank DCO in overseas business in Nigeria and indeed Africa 
has not been reflected sufficiently in the academic literature. In the 1960s, Barclays Bank DCO 
and Lloyds were the two major British overseas banks. In contrast to Lloyds, which had very 
few interests in Africa, Barclays was a major investor there.
xi
 In the 1940s Nigeria was far from 
being the crown jewel of the DCO Empire. Due to massive investment in the 1950s, the 
promising economic outlook following the discovery of oil, and the new opportunities created 
by the state-run marketing boards, Barclays’s business in Nigeria became the second most 
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profitable area within the Bank in the 1960s. This was part and parcel of a strategy preparing the 
company for independence that began as early as 1952. 
This article aims to show how Barclays in Nigeria prepared for independence with two sets 
of measures: firstly by extending its business and involvement with the local community by 
opening more branches and extending savings accounts and credit, and secondly by 
‘indigenising’ its staff. This was also referred to as Africanisation or Nigerianisation and 
became an issue for Barclays and other British firms after 1945. A parallel development took 
place in the colonial government, but while the government was mostly Nigerianised by 1960, 
in many British firms only a few Nigerian managers were promoted during the late 1950s and 
1960s. The expansion of business encountered obstacles such as high costs and risk, staffing 
problems and bad lending decisions. After independence, the bank successfully consolidated the 
rapid changes that had occurred in the 1950s, but problems remained: conflicts between local 
and expatriate staff and between Nigerian and London-based general management continue to 
impede operations and decision-making.  
Local interests continued to be subordinate to metropolitan corporate concerns, which was 
the case for many foreign firms in Nigeria. In the aftermath of Empire this was perceived as 
‘neo-colonialism’, as it constituted a continuation of organisational forms closely associated 
with the imperial system; Barclays was often referred to as the ‘Bankers of Empire’.xii This 
poses the question whether a parallel decolonisation of the economy happened and whether the 
indigenisation of staff is a reasonably good indicator for the extent to which a business can be 
considered ‘decolonised’. This article focuses on the changes within the firm, particularly with 
regard to the composition of its workforce and management, which occurred in the decade 
either side of independence, before radical politics changed the commercial landscape in the 
1970s. What it maintains is that after independence control remained in British hands but was 
gradually being eroded; some elements in management would have preferred more Nigerian 
participation but were unable to prevail in the decision-making process within the bank. As a 
result the bank was not well positioned for the shift in policy towards foreign business that 
followed the effective end of the civil war in 1969.  
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I 
Barclays’s growth in Nigeria during the 1950s and 1960s was remarkable and can be 
regarded as a positive reaction to political and economic change. However, while the bank 
expanded rapidly in the 1950s, commercially the policy was not a particular success and was 
indeed marked by many difficulties. It was after independence that Barclays in Nigeria became, 
at least for a time, really successful. In this section the bank’s business, including the stresses 
and problems of its expansion programme are sketched out before the Nigerianisation process is 
considered in greater detail. 
Barclays Bank DCO had been created in 1925 out of the merger of the National Bank of 
South Africa and the Anglo-Egyptian and Colonial Bank, the latter of which had business in 
Nigeria. The Bank of British West Africa (BBWA), its main competitor, however, had been 
founded as early as 1894 by Alfred Jones of Elder Dempster and counted the colonial 
government as one of its clients. Despite these disadvantages, Barclays had grown to about 
equal size by 1945 and both British banks dwarfed their foreign and local competitors, as Figure 
1 shows. 
 
Figure 1: Bank branches in Nigeria, 1952 –1962 
YEAR 1952 1954 1962 
BBWA 18 27 55 
Barclays Bank DCO 10 22 57 
British & French Bank (later UBA) 1 2 11 
National Bank of Nigeria 9 20 31 
Merchants Bank - 1 failed? 
Agbonmagde Bank 3 3 9 
African Continental Bank 10 14 21 
Nigerian Farmers and Commercial Bank 28 failed failed 
Standard 7 failed failed 
Bank of the North - - 5 
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Banque de l'Afrique Occidentale - - 2 
Berini - - 1 
Bank of Lagos - - 1 
Muslim Bank - - 1 
Bank of America - - 1 
Chase Manhattan - - 1 
Co-operative East - - 3 
Co-operative West - - 4 
Total 86 (51) * 89 204 
* In brackets offices of the banks surviving the crash of indigenous banking 1952. 
 
Source: 1952 and 1962 from: C. V. Brown, The Nigerian Banking System (London: George & Allen Unwin Ltd., 
1966) pp. 79 – 80; 1954 from “Report on the Banking Position in Nigeria as at the 31st December 1954” Bank of 
England Archive OV 68/3; Boreham, handwritten note, July 1961, BGA 80/4448. 
 
In 1950 the number of branches indicates that BBWA’s business was slightly greater than 
Barclays’s, the former having 12 and the latter 9 branches. Nevertheless, due to the fierce 
competition between the two banks, Barclays overtook the other bank’s 55 branches by two in 
1962 and extended this lead in later years. Barclays could only support a branch expansion 
programme of this size if they extended their services to new customers. With only a few 
exceptions, in 1950 Barclays’s branches were in expatriate areas where it was unlikely to recruit 
indigenous customers. Thereafter they opened offices either in the Nigerian parts of the large 
coastal cities and administrative centres or moved to bigger indigenous commercial towns. 
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Figure 2: Barclays Branches in Nigeria, 1945 – 1970 
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Source: Barclays Group Archive Wythenshawe, Branch Catalogue. This graph includes branches, sub-branches and 
agencies.xiii 
 
As the graph above shows, the increase in Nigeria was considerable, especially since the 
country had had the lowest bank branch density of the entire colonial Empire.
xiv
 The expansion 
between 1953 and 1957 put a strain on Barclays’s resources, not only in terms of capital but 
with regard to personnel and organisation as well. The opening of new branches was to a certain 
extent funded by the money that Barclays received through savings accounts. These accounts 
had been on offer for a relatively long period of time, but were hardly significant overall, since 
the widespread illiteracy amongst the indigenous population and a general reluctance to 
advertise the bank’s products made the availability of savings accounts a well-kept secret.xv 
Substituting fingerprints for a signature solved the problem of illiterate customers. The success 
justified the changes at Barclays; by 1960 African savings amounted to £8m out of £15m of 
total deposits.
xvi
 
Barclays could not allow its deposits to remain idle funds, and ‘lending to Africans’ became 
a key part in the bank’s decolonisation strategy, but it ultimately failed. While it was 
commercially necessary to lend the funds deposited in savings accounts again, there was a 
political motivation in prioritising Africans as borrowers. Nationalists and anti-colonialists 
began rallying against the discrimination of Africans by the expatriate banks. This was not a 
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new complaint, but, contrary to the trading companies, the bank had been spared in the Accra 
riots in the Gold Coast in 1948, an event that shook expatriate business throughout West 
Africa.
xvii
 The years between 1950 and 1955 had seen a boom in the opening of indigenous 
banks, although some of these collapsed after the introduction of new standards in the Banking 
Ordinance in 1952 (see Figure 1). Only a few survived, amongst them the African Continental 
Bank (ACB) owned by the nationalist politician Nnamdi Azikiwe, who used the mass collapse 
of indigenous banking and the ensuing scandal around his bank to condemn publicly the lending 
practices of the big foreign banks.
xviii
 Thus political motives feature strongly in Barclays’s 
growth, particularly with the man who was the main driving force behind much of the 
expansion programme and change in staffing in the mid-1950s: Jack Cade, a general manager 
from London Head Office.
xix
 
The main reasons for poor lending performance were the low discretionary limits of the 
African managers and their lack of experience in credit procedures due to the absence of 
structured training. The following episode regarding a sub-branch in Ibadan, illustrates the 
situation particularly in the smaller branches: 
 
The African Clerk-in-charge had a discretionary limit of only £25, and only the sketchiest 
idea of how to deal with the problems of lending to Africans (or anybody else!). […] The 
Clerk-in-charge described his advances as “overnight only”, and they were of small 
amounts. No record was kept of advances declined, and reasons. […] It is quite hopeless to 
send these Africans out and put them in charge of branches on the present casual system. In 
due course the Discretionary Limit will have to be raised. Subsequently at the main branch I 
discussed the advances of this Sub-Branch with Bashorun, who used to be in charge of it. 
He says the Africans in this district are quite unworthy of credit at all! An African view of 
Africans!
xx
 
 
Cade ensured that limits were raised and more credit extended. However, by the late 1950s it 
became increasingly clear that the new lending policy was leading to a sharp rise in bad and 
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doubtful debts. This was not exclusively a problem that concerned African staff. Even some of 
the more experienced European managers of big branches had ignored instructions about 
lending procedures, but problems with them arose because their higher discretionary limits 
allowed them to extend substantial credit to unreliable traders. Lack of supervision and 
inexperienced staff, insufficient training and overstretched resources were not the only problems 
Cade’s new policy exposed.xxi Bashorun’s remarks highlight the lack of understanding of local 
‘creditworthiness’ that even progressive minds such as Cade exhibited. Furthermore, the bank’s 
system of rotating branch management, designed to prevent fraud, turned out to be a further 
obstacle when it came to recovering advances. Debtors would consider themselves in an alliance 
with the manager who had accepted their request for a loan, probably because face-to-face 
relations were prevalent in the Nigerian economy at the time. Therefore, the successor at the 
respective branch would find it hard to impossible to get the money back.
xxii
 
It does not suffice to focus only on the problems of local staff, as the pressure put on the 
section by Head Office in London was considerable and inconsistent with the commercial 
strategy. In the words of a London official ‘we are paying a heavy price for pushing Lagos Head 
Office (LHO) into a lending policy which at this time of growth they were not able to 
control.’xxiii Although Cade’s policy was certainly progressive, it was not carefully worked out 
and only poorly translated into action, which led to one of the biggest crises for Barclays in 
Nigeria, just at the time of independence. In 1959 an ‘old friend’ of Barclays, the Emir of Kano, 
alerted a visiting Assistant General Manager to the imminent danger of losing money, as they 
had lent to the wrong people: 
 
[…] instead of, as I expected, his commenting on our not lending enough money, he said he 
felt the Banks had lent too much both to the Lebanese and to Nigerian people, and that the 
Banks would not, in some cases, get their money back.
xxiv
 
 
In July 1960 a Central Board Director reported £1.4m of bad and doubtful debts, a figure that 
would rise to £2.5m, largely irrecoverable, in 1963 when the investigation was finished. How 
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much of this was due to African advances is hard to discern. The only existing figures date from 
31
st
 January 1960, when the total of bad and doubtful debts was believed to be £950,975 out of 
total advances of £4,933,775. Credit to indigenous businessmen accounted for 43 per cent, but 
the provision for bad debts on African lending was about 75 per cent of the total provision.
xxv
 
However, this is no safe indication since the majority of bad debts were discovered later, 
especially the ones at Kano branch, headed by a British expatriate, where £1m was found to be 
irrecoverable. In this case the largest single item was nearly £900,000 lent to the London & 
Kano Trading Co., a British firm that existed at least since the 1920s.
xxvi
 Subsequently the 
British manager of Kano branch was quietly removed and the fact that almost half of the bad 
and doubtful debts, which, earlier on, had been considered a problem exclusively of African 
customers, were caused by expatriate collusion was never flagged up. 
One of the reasons why Barclays performed so badly was that commercial and political 
strategies were not clearly articulated. Marketing Boards, established in 1947, introduced 
officially set prices and made it less attractive for the trading companies to maintain their outlets 
and produce buying agencies in the hinterland, where they had provided quasi-banking 
services.
xxvii
 The race between the banks to place their branches in key positions of an emerging 
market was a commercial necessity. Nevertheless, Barclays had to react to political demands of 
improving and extending banking services at the same time. Moreover, the management had to 
consider how they could position the company favourably at independence. The London general 
manager Richard Dyson remarked in 1952: 
 
[…] in view of present political developments I felt it was important that we should, as soon 
as practicable, open further branches.
xxviii
 
 
Clearly, the company principals had been preparing for independence and reacted to the 
pressures of decolonisation. This is particularly evident with regard to lending. Cade once 
remarked that he had to ‘kill the legend that we won’t lend to Africans’, even if that meant 
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giving credit indiscriminately, without being able to assess the creditworthiness of the 
individual. 
 
It is suggested that generous lendings are being made to small income people. Such 
lendings are not what we want, but we do not want this persistent allegation that we won’t 
lend to Africans, and if there is propaganda we must counter it.
xxix
 
 
While Barclays’s decision to expand might have been partly commercially motivated, its 
design, timing and speed were determined by political factors. At the same time Nigerianisation 
changed the composition of staff, in particular that of the management, which was previously 
exclusively white. In the end, the expansion could only be supported by a change of focus to a 
broader customer base. While decolonisation made Barclays’s business in Nigeria bigger and 
more successful than ever before, it also strengthened the bargaining position of Nigerians as 
customers and members of staff vis-à-vis the bank. 
By 1960 the situation had calmed down. To observers sent by the London management the 
entire ‘lending to Africans’ affair was hardly understandable in hindsight. 
 
Our business has developed, and continues to develop, satisfactorily but the policy of 
wholesale lendings to Africans has proved premature and costly. It is not that all lendings to 
Africans are bad and indeed the Banks have had many African customers, both individual 
and corporate, with whom satisfactory business has been conducted over a number of years. 
In fact, so much business was already being done with Africans, particularly through the co-
operatives, that it is difficult to understand why it was thought necessary to force the pace, a 
policy which has resulted in heavy losses.
xxx
 
 
The increase in business due to branch expansion as well as savings and lendings led to 
intensified recruitment of both British as well as local staff. Barclays, however, still tended to 
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rely more on British staff, something that, in the light of political developments, became a 
highly charged issue. 
 
II 
The indigenisation of the colonial administration began after the war and soon accelerated 
due to the impact of the Accra riots in 1948 and the constitutional development in the 1950s. 
Throughout the West African colonies Nigerians and Ghanaians were taking over ever more 
important and high-ranking official posts. Barclays’s managers acknowledged that the 
Nigerianisation of the colonial service would have an impact on British companies at an early 
stage. In 1948 Donald Carter, the London General Manager (Staff), demanded on a tour to West 
Africa that the bank should ‘give more responsibility to our African staff’. Richard Dyson made 
it clear in 1952 that ‘the speed with which Africanisation is proceeding in the political field is 
bound to have its repercussions in other spheres including our own.’xxxi 
With both the government and private sector competing for talented African staff, 
Nigerianisation was problematic. The establishment of Barclays’s own training centre in Lagos 
in 1956 has to be seen in the light of complaints that the best school graduates were entering 
government service. This was not only due to better salaries and social emoluments but also 
because it offered further education and opportunities to go to the UK or the United States. J. B. 
Loynes of the Bank of England remarked on the problems Barclays was facing in 1958 
 
The steady efflux of white officials from the regional administration had caused 
regional governments to offer attractive terms, including scholarships in the UK, to 
Africans. This had led to a serious drain on the promising African staff of Barclays 
DCO, doubtless BWA as well, at a time when the Bank needed to be at full strength to 
cope with its rapid expansion. The resignation of Africans had forced the Bank to 
import more European staff involving substantial outlays on housing etc.xxxii 
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Loynes’ assessment of the situation highlighted Barclays’s self-interest in indigenising. 
Business itself, not only politics, demanded the employment of more and better qualified 
Africans since the bank had embarked on a programme of rapid branch expansion. This made it 
increasingly difficult to find enough staff, African and European alike, a universal problem for 
expatriate firms in West Africa. However, the rate of indigenisation at Barclays compared 
unfavourably not only with the civil service but also with the big trading companies. Like the 
Bank of British West Africa (BBWA) and other banks, they were in general much slower in 
giving even limited responsibility to their indigenous employees, particularly when compared to 
the UAC.
xxxiii
  
In 1952, at a time when 11.9 per cent of the UAC management in Nigeria was ‘izated’, 
Barclays had no African branch manager or sub-manager or even appointed accountant. This 
comparison is unfortunately limited to 1952, the only year for which there is a detailed list of 
Barclays’s senior staff. At this time Barclays employed 57 Europeans and 174 African clerks in 
Nigeria.xxxiv The Nigerians constituted 22.2 per cent within the group of ‘senior’ employees, 
which includes the management, accountants and all A– and B–signatories.xxxv None, however, 
had climbed higher than the lowest rank of senior staff, the B-signatories, of whom about half 
were Nigerian. Moreover, while the average income of B-signatories was similar, only the 
expatriates were eligible for allowances, which averaged £242, the minimum being £200 
territorial allowance. The average age of the local staff in management grades was 45 years 
compared with the British average age of 27.
xxxvi
 These figures illustrate that Africans had a 
much lower income than their significantly younger expatriate colleagues, who had fewer years 
of service with the bank. While the base salary for the same job seemed to be the same, 
allowances formed an important part of expatriate income and expatriates could expect to get 
promoted earlier.  
Although Barclays lagged behind the UAC with regard to indigenisation, in the early stages 
of the programme there seems to have been a mutual understanding between their principals 
about the local staff. In 1951, Julian Crossley, Chairman of DCO, met Frank Samuel from the 
UAC: 
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[Frank Samuel] pointed out that their local African staff had not yet progressed far 
enough to take responsibility, even of a Store manager. He asked how far we had been 
able to give authority to local Africans, which is not yet very far, although they are quite 
good at routine duties. Although at a small branch the second man might be an African, 
we should not at present feel able to leave one in charge, even of a small branch.
xxxvii
 
 
However, this should not obscure the fact that the UAC had sent the company secretary, A. 
R. I. Mellor, to West Africa to assess its relations there as early as 1948, which uncovered unfair 
and racial treatment of African employees and numerous other reasons for the firm’s 
unpopularity. On the basis of this report the UAC began to Africanise, restructure its 
commercial policies and introduce public relations measures.
xxxviii
 Of course UAC stores had 
been amongst the main targets of public outrage in the Accra riots earlier in 1948, which 
Barclays escaped almost unscathed. While not making a major re-assessment of its operations, 
1948 was the year in which the first three Nigerians were considered for a B-Signature. One of 
the three, G. A. Onagoruwa, wrote a letter to Carter not only comparing better opportunities in 
other companies but also highlighting the level of discrimination:  
 
It is my own humble opinion that an African whose work is considered good and who 
possesses the necessary qualifications should after 10 years be able to earn the initial salary 
of a European in the same employment.
xxxix
 
 
In the late 1950s, when independence was imminent, the situation became more fluid, 
although the process of Africanisation in senior management was still relatively slow. Robert 
Mensah was the first Ghanaian to be appointed as a branch manager in 1957, the year of 
Ghana’s independence. He later became Local Director in Ghana and assumed executive 
responsibilities in this position.
xl
 In Nigeria there was no parallel African figure to whom the 
Bank was willing to give that much responsibility at the time. A number of people were tested 
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in ‘acting’ management positions, which meant filling in for a European on leave, or were put in 
charge of small sub-branches or agencies. Mr. Bashorun, one of the Nigerians suggested for a 
B-signature in 1948, had been manager of an Ibadan sub-branch before 1958, and in 1960 seven 
sub-branches and agencies in total were Nigerianised. In 1962 one indigenous manager, Mallam 
Aba of Funtua, a distant relative to the Emir of Kano, even occupied a bank house, formerly a 
privilege reserved entirely for expatriates.
xli
 Probably more important was the appointment of 
the first African, E. Inwang, to become a Local Head Office manager in 1961. He began as 
Assistant Staff Manager but was soon moved on to become the first manager of African staff. 
However, apart from a few talented young men placed in highly visible positions, indigenisation 
proceeded more slowly than anticipated even by the European management. General Manager 
F. A. Boreham had emphasised the importance of a ‘more positive approach to Nigerianisation’ 
in 1961 but three years later ten out of eleven branches, which were supposed to have been 
Nigerianised in the previous two years, were still under European management.
xlii
 While the 
UAC had had Mellor’s report in 1948 and the Colonial Office (CO) made it clear in a policy 
paper in 1953 that they would take charge of Africanisation to ensure they would continue be 
able to guide its progress, Barclays’s policy remained under-articulated and rather haphazard.xliii 
 
For Barclays the problem was twofold; on the one hand the management complained about 
the low quality of the indigenous staff while at the same time they were drained of their more 
experienced local staff who went on to better paid jobs, or to training and further education in 
the UK, which led Barclays to increase the salary minima for more senior African officials in 
1961.
xliv
  
With the transfer of power practically completed, Barclays entered calmer waters. Staffing 
problems remained, but the end of new branch openings took the edge off it (see Figure 1). As a 
visiting manager from London concluded in 1960: 
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Expansion has been very rapid and, in the main, we believe this has been right as we must 
now be in a strong position vis-à-vis competitors. We are equally sure that the present time, 
and the immediate future, must be a period of consolidation.
xlv
 
 
This consolidation programme involved bringing in a new general manager to lead the 
section, briefed to boost profits, and changing the composition of the local board to reflect a 
greater Nigerian identity. Apart from the general manager and the three British local directors, 
three so-called advisory directors, a Hausa, an Igbo and a Yoruba were appointed. The function 
of the indigenous advisory directors was clearly representative, with the choice of ethnicity 
serving the purpose of representing the original three regions within the Nigerian federation. 
While all three of them were chosen for the high esteem in which they were held in the 
community, none of them had any banking experience, which, it was hoped, would preclude 
them from attempting to gain any executive powers. Leonard Daldry, the outgoing local director 
and soon-to-be chairman of the new board, was nevertheless nervous about the possible dangers 
of such a move: 
 
[They] might confuse the functions of management and directorate and try to usurp the 
prerogatives of management. […] The Nigerians […] seem to get a feeling of compulsion to 
dominate the meeting, even sometimes to the detriment of common sense, if their numbers 
are approximately equal to the Europeans.
 xlvi
 
 
However, none of the directors apparently ever attempted to influence the bank’s operations. 
The great benefit of the move, according to Barclays, was the positive publicity they received, 
especially in political circles, in spite of James Robertson’s warnings that the appointment of 
three Nigerians should not ‘appear as a mere façade’.xlvii  DCO’s chairman Julian Crossley 
summed up his impression of the changes as follows: 
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I think, and hope, that the impression created by this new set-up will be to give it a more 
businesslike appearance, and to show that we do indeed mean business. It will be regarded as 
the Bank’s response to the changed conditions created by the newly independent State of 
Nigeria.
xlviii
 
 
The approval was not as unanimous as the bank’s managers reported back to London Head 
Office though, as this remark from a Nigerian senator illustrates: 
 
The trend now is to call every company a Nigerian company. That is, somebody is appointed 
from the outside, a Nigerian, one foolish man, who is usually given a big salary, so that they 
can call the company Nigerian. He has nothing to do with the company.
xlix
 
 
Unsurprisingly, the local board did not herald a new Nigerian influence on Barclays, but the 
change of the management from Daldry to the new General Manager Edward Ambrose did 
make a major difference to the bank’s operations. Profits doubled between 1961 and 1963 to 
over a million pounds; in comparison the half-year profit in 1959 had been £193,000 which was 
further reduced by ‘administrative costs and other expenses’ to a mere £78,000.l Deposits and 
saving had been steadily growing throughout this time, and the change in profit was due to a 
strict policy of cost cutting. The number of staff – especially non-clerical – diminished, due to 
the successful introduction of mechanisation after 1952 and a streamlining of procedures. The 
deployment of ‘expensive’ expatriate staff was much more closely monitored than before and 
Nigerianisation, although still far from being impressive, now gained more ground. However, 
ceilings to the advancement of local managers were still firmly in place: 
 
Though there are a number of good steady Africans in responsible positions, they nearly all 
seemed to me to lack the spark of real managerial ability; they might run small or medium 
sized branches adequately but would be unlikely ever to show the self–confidence and 
initiative needed to build up or expand a business.
li
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Barclays’s managers showed little confidence in the ability of their African managers, which 
in itself might have been the main cause for the rather slow Nigerianisation. In a parallel to the 
bad debt problem it seemed ‘very difficult for a European to assess the character and ability of 
an African’, as Freddy Seebohm from London head office remarked in 1954.lii ‘Character’, an 
idea derived from the public school tradition, was the main criterion not only of Barclays when 
recruiting and assessing their employees, but of the British multinational banks most generally, 
as Geoffrey Jones highlighted in his study of British multinational banking.
liii
 Nevertheless, 
Nigerianisation had removed most of the old ceilings on the advancement of Africans apart 
from one: large branch management was the last preserve for Europeans. In 1966 the younger 
expatriate staff voiced their discontent with a company that, in their view, was committed to 
‘Nigerianise as fast as possible’, to Seebohm, by then chairman of DCO, who remarked on this: 
 
The answer to these questions are, on the whole, obvious and the fact is that although 75 per 
cent of the young men are quite first class, there is an element that ought not to be in the 
Bank. When these are identified, I feel that we ought to grasp the nettle and get rid of them. 
There is no place in the future of the bank for anyone who is not (a) loyal, or (b) potentially a 
large branch manager.
liv
 
 
With Africans taking more and more jobs that used to be reserved for expatriates and the 
bank’s departure from its old policy of guaranteed life-long employment, European staff were 
under the increased pressure of being rationalised away. This explains the reluctance and, at 
times, the active obstruction of the indigenisation programme by expatriate staff at Barclays. 
During decolonisation a similar development occurred in the colonial administration, which led 
the Colonial Office to comment on a hardening of attitudes against Nigeria appointments and 
promotions in 1954. By 1956 a compensation scheme for the public service had been 
introduced, which allowed officials to retire and withdraw gradually when qualified Africans 
were available. In contrast, the options for redeployment of Barclays’s staff were running out 
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while the bank showed more inclination than before to lay off people. The unavoidable conflict 
of interest between expatriate and local managers was not as easily resolved as the more 
successful transfer of power from the colonial state to Nigerian authorities.
lv
 
In the 1960s the new state started to handle expatriate quotas regulating the numbers of 
personnel to come from Britain for work more restrictively and imposed limits to increase the 
pressure on firms to Nigerianise more rapidly. This made it harder for Barclays to move staff 
around the globe as freely as before. At the same time the opportunities to repatriate funds to 
London decreased through regulations in the newly decolonised countries. Neither money nor 
people – and therefore knowledge – were the flexible assets that they used to be. The end of 
colonialism led to nationalist economic policies in many less developed countries, attempting to 
gain more leverage in a world system in which they were relatively powerless. The breakdown 
of the Bretton Woods system, the weakness and devaluation of the pound, the oil crises of the 
1970s and the Latin American debt crisis in 1982 were further factors that led to more 
restrictions and rendered the internationalist measures for a global economy, introduced after 
the Second World War, obsolete. For Barclays, the increasing restrictions of movement of 
personnel and funds went to the heart of its business. Nigerianisation represented a possibility to 
imbue its Nigerian staff with the spirit and ‘character’ of British banking. However, the slow 
implementation indicates that the principals were far from content with the outcome and 
essentially still distrustful along racial lines. On the other hand, Nigerianisation was the central 
demand of African trade unions and the Nigerian government – hoping to effect greater local 
control by having Nigerian managers heading foreign firms. Again, employees and politicians 
were disappointed and lost faith that changes in staff would be sufficient. The failure to 
implement rapid Nigerianisation successfully raised the question of who, ultimately, controlled 
Barclays; a conflict that intensified in the late 1960s and ultimately climaxed with the 
indigenisation programmes of the 1970s. The next section analyses the transition from 
Nigerianisation to increased legal restrictions of foreign businesses and the changes wrought by 
the civil war. 
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III 
In the mid-1960s Nigerians had advanced to take on management positions in Head Office 
and represented the bank as directors. However, in terms of real and actual control this meant 
little. Barclays lagged behind its own plans to Nigerianise its branches and Africans who 
reached the top echelon were moved to purely representative posts or to newly created positions 
with no power over finances or expatriates. The relatively laissez-faire attitude of the early post-
colonial state had not forced Barclays to implement changes on the same scale as in the 1950s.  
The second half of the 1960s was a time of upheaval for Nigeria and Barclays was 
confronted with unpopular choices. The military coup on 15 January 1966 by General Agui-
Ironsi removed a number of political figures with whom Barclays had enjoyed close contacts, 
among them the assassinated Premier of the Western Region, Chief Akintola, and the Sardauna 
of Sokoto. Several crises in the 1960s preceded the coup. Shortly after the initial coup, Gowon, 
a Hausa general, overthrew Agui-Ironsi, the Igbo general, in June 1966 and rioting between 
northerners and southerners ensued until September. In 1967 the eastern region decided to 
secede from the Federation of Nigeria under the new name Biafra.
lvi
  
Barclays’s eastern branches were effectively removed from the main operations and put 
under the official control of John Okwesa, who had been the Igbo director on Barclays’s board 
since 1961, but effectively managed by the senior Nigerian employee, Jibueze. The Nigerian 
state expected the bank to take a clear and unequivocal stand against Biafra and terminate 
business there. Barclays, however, was not prepared to give up branches and assets in the east 
and served both sides. Soon after the army recaptured the east, London Head Office sent an 
Assistant General Manager to check on staff, branches and records. 
 
The chap in charge was called Jibuwezi who was our most senior African at the time in 
eastern Nigeria and he became General Manager (as he styled himself) of Barclays in Biafra. 
Amazingly, they did quite well. They organised themselves literally as a separate bank; they 
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had all the normal things like cash runs, maintained their records and accounts. Of course the 
whole thing was really quite artificial, with no proper financial controls in the country.
lvii
 
 
His comment shows that despite the still prevailing condescension towards African 
employees they were far better qualified and capable of running a bank than the British 
managers had ever imagined. While the section could not have made any profits, because 
Nigeria changed its currency and did not accept Biafran money, their deposits had doubled from 
£14m to £28m, they had kept the branches open during the civil war and had not only kept 
records meticulously but protected them from the incoming army. Of all foreign business only 
the banks and the UAC group had continued to operate.
lviii
 
During the civil war a marked change occurred in the relation between the state and the 
banks. While the first Banking Ordinance in 1962 had specified that the liquid assets held 
overseas must not exceed 7.5 per cent of a bank’s total deposits – something that Barclays did 
not find it hard to comply with – the policy of the Central Bank had changed with the departure 
of the last British expatriate manager in 1964. In 1968 Barclays became increasingly nervous 
about the situation in Nigeria. Later that year their fears were partly vindicated with Part 10 of 
the Companies Act, which decreed that banks and other foreign business had to incorporate 
locally and make their equity available to the wider public. On 30 March 1969 Barclays Bank 
DCO (Nigeria) Ltd. went public as Barclays Bank of Nigeria Ltd. – a last minute name change 
to reflect a greater ‘Nigerian’ identity.lix 
Internally, however, William Duncan, general manager in Nigeria since 1963, presented a 
radical plan for the future of Barclays’s Nigerian business. He claimed in his paper that soon 
indigenous banks would outstrip the ‘British’ banks, because they appealed to national 
sentiment. He therefore advised that Barclays should hive off part of the African business and, 
ideally, forge an agreement with one of the indigenous banks, preferably the National Bank of 
Nigeria, which would ultimately handle the Nigerian end of the business while Barclays 
provided the services in the main financial centres outside Nigeria. This was a highly 
contentious plan and while the nationalisation in Tanzania still haunted the management, 
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Barclays was disinclined to let go one of their largest most profitable sections.lx Moreover, none 
of the indigenous banks were in a financial position to buy and take over the business and 
extensive branch network of one of the biggest expatriate banks.  
Although Duncan’s plan never came to fruition, it highlighted diverging positions within 
Barclays, an almost generational conflict between the bank’s managers. Duncan had set off a 
debate that was mirrored by an exchange of letters between the former chairman Sir Julian 
Crossley, who had presided over much of Barclays’s expansion in the 1950s and 1960s, and his 
successor, Freddy Seebohm. Seebohm believed that Barclays could continue to work as they 
used to with local subsidiaries despite localisation and participation measures. Crossley, 
however, maintained: 
 
My belief is simply that in making the approach ourselves we are weakening our position 
and achieving nothing in the process, because mere localisation gives no protection whatever 
for the future and, indeed, might even invite further action.lxi 
 
The old guard was beginning to lose out. A year later, the chairman-designate of Barclays, F. 
A. Tuke, toured Nigeria and received the advice that if ‘the bank took the view that sooner or 
later we would have to make a deal, all experience in Africa proved that the sooner you make 
the deal the better the deal will be’.lxii Barclays had abandoned its old hard line position in 
favour of collaborating constructively with the government. In 1970 it was clear to the bank’s 
managers that the old stance was no longer viable. Again Tuke made a very accurate guess at 
future developments: 
 
The rate at which we sell shares to local interest is difficult to gauge but it seems more than 
likely that we will be obliged to move towards a 51 per cent or possibly 60 per cent Nigerian 
shareholding during the next four or five years.
lxiii
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In 1971 the Nigerian government acquired 40 per cent of the bank’s stock, which increased 
to a majority holding of 60 per cent in 1976. This indigenisation policy quickly showed its 
limits, as it discouraged the inflow of new capital and investment. In the 1980s it was already 
being partly revised.
lxiv
 
 
IV 
Barclays’s situation in Nigeria corresponded to some extent to the changes in the global 
economy. The non-Western world, by the late 1960s largely decolonised, was becoming more 
radical. Dependency theorists and historical materialists re-assessed the role of multinational 
companies and their ability to help developing countries modernise. Old development doctrine 
seemed to have failed, and political elites that had banked on it were swept away. In Nigeria, 
furthermore, this coincided with political and ethnic tensions that the new state proved 
incapable of solving. The outlook of Barclays and other British firms at the end of Empire was 
changing fundamentally by the end of the 1960s, more so probably than during decolonisation, 
when general wisdom still proclaimed a future for business in Africa if it only slightly adapted 
to the new states. During the 1950s the late colonial state in Nigeria took a more active part in 
the commerce and development of the country through the marketing boards. For the large 
trading companies such as UAC and others this meant a re-orientation away from their old bulk 
export-import business to wholesale trading of more sophisticated goods, which, in the medium 
term proved successful. For the banks, the change was even more beneficial. Both the Bank of 
British West Africa and Barclays expanded on a massive scale and tapped a formerly 
underestimated financial resource – African savings. However, the growth in activity did not 
lead automatically to a growth in profits, at least in the short term. Evidence from Barclays 
suggests that BBWA suffered from the same bad debt problem in the late 1950s, which 
illustrated the main shortcoming of British foreign business: assessing its African customers, 
and, by extension, its African employees and other important stakeholders. 
The question of evaluating the trustworthiness and ability of an individual became the central 
problem of the Barclays’s policy of Nigerianisation. Recreating local managers of the required 
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‘character’ of a British banker seemed an insurmountable task. However, the very character of 
British banking was changing with the demise of Sterling as a reserve currency, the creation of 
the Euro-Dollar markets and the ascendancy of the United States, Germany and Japan as main 
global investors. Both the bad debt problem and the slow progress of Nigerianisation 
highlighted the failure to match reality with an ideal that was rapidly losing its guiding 
functions. The experience of the Biafran civil war proved the British managers’ adverse 
assessment of their African staff wrong, since Africans showed the ability and the endurance to 
continue the business in the East. The civil war changed the situation in Nigeria in a number of 
ways: Duncan’s ‘Plan for the Future’ and the controversy it caused probably illustrates this best. 
Duncan showed faith that locals could manage the Nigerian end of the business profitably, but 
he underlined the inability of British staff to deflect nationalist criticism and to understand the 
local market sufficiently. General Managers in London, however, were not prepared to 
relinquish direct control and retreat to manage their Nigerian branches at arm’s length. 
Nigerianisation represented an incremental change from within the bank, but it did not keep 
pace with political developments. The patience of the new military government was eroding, 
and the Companies Act of 1968 was the beginning of a new policy that led to the indigenisation 
decrees in the 1970s.  
Africanisation and the increase of business conducted with local interests were part and 
parcel of the bank’s decolonisation strategy. While they initially seemed to be creating more 
problems than they solved, adjustments in management and implementation turned DCO’s 
Nigerian section into a success story, at least in terms of financial results, by the mid-1960s. 
Nevertheless, local managers often faced expatriate resistance when it came to promotions, due 
to the lack of other opportunities for them within the bank. Moreover, local and metropolitan 
management faced conflicts over strategies: while London management initially pushed for 
more progressive policies on Africanisation as well as in the savings and loans business, by the 
late 1960s the ‘progressive’ general mangers that had been installed in Nigeria – first Ambrose, 
then Duncan – were moving too fast for London’s taste. While progress in indigenisation at 
Barclays, in line with other companies, remained constant, the civil war and the political 
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radicalisation that came in its wake undermined the position of foreign business, and DCO and 
others could not adjust to this. However, the initial success that Barclays experienced in the 
newly independent state, which afforded the bank a sense of security – however misplaced – can 
be traced back to the actions during decolonisation. DCO was anything but a bystander to the 
grand political developments, and this article confirms Sarah Stockwell’s findings on the active 
part business tried to play during these years. While it is seemingly correct that there was no 
commonality of interest or cooperation between imperial business and the colonial 
administration, this was only a logical extension of different perspectives: business was there to 
stay and found the quickening pace of withdrawal from political control at first unsettling. 
However, once independence became a certainty, business followed the administrative example 
in Africanising its labour force and its suggestions to begin working more closely with the 
nominated elite. Thus the initial conflict was soon superseded by a new orientation more in line 
with the political progress, but economic developments inevitably trailed behind. 
The apparent time lag between political and economic decolonisation underlines the 
importance of considering post-colonial business and its relation to the newly independent state. 
The Africanisation of staff is an important indicator of how well adapted the overseas firms 
were to the changed local conditions. However, ‘economic decolonisation’ is rarely defined 
clearly, and while David Fieldhouse introduces the term in his preface, where he “loosely” 
describes it as a process of casting off or limiting the power of foreign merchant capital by the 
newly sovereign African states.
lxv
 There is a sense that economic demands and Africanisation 
are related, but it is unclear in how far it is more than a convenient catchall for nationalist 
propaganda. On the other hand his work has the great merit of focusing on internal business 
processes that are inherently more revealing than studies that take the way companies are 
represented (by themselves or by outsiders) for granted. To determine the role of British 
imperial business in Nigeria and West Africa in general it is necessary to approach the subject 
with a combination of detailed, archivally based studies of the major firms while at the same 
time overcoming the inherent bias in the sources towards telling a narrative that focuses entirely 
on the metropolitan story. Moreover, the events of the 1970s, which are Biersteker’s subject, 
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should not obscure the fact that the indigenisation of staff, partly forced through the state’s 
increasingly restrictive handling of expatriate quotas, had been a deliberate attempt on the part 
of Barclays to appease public and political opinion.  The bank however was too uncomfortable 
to ultimately entrust the control of the Nigerian section to an African, while the Nigerian state 
decided to bring foreign business under its control.  A focus simply on changes in equity 
ownership thus overlooks the internal restructuring of imperial business that took place over two 
decades. More importantly, it does not account for the shortcomings of the NEPDs, in particular 
for so-called ‘fronting’: placing a Nigerian as owner and director, who did not insist on having 
any executive power. Behind this ‘Nigerian façade’ the business was run by expatriates like 
before. If the NEPDs are seen as an attempt to enforce Africanisation, avoidance strategies such 
as ‘fronting’ are far less surprising, because they had already been used during the 
Nigerianisation of the boards of directors (see quote on page 17).  Analysing ownership, which 
was only a means to an end, has shown its limits in contributing to the understanding of control 
and the limited success of the NEPDs. Seeing them as part of a longer running negotiation 
process between the state and foreign business, in which the Africanisation of staff and 
management was the main area of contention, forms the basis of a new understanding of the role 
of decolonisation and nationalism for the expropriation of foreign interests. 
 
Stephanie Decker, University of Liverpool 
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Figure 1: 
 
YEAR 1952 1954 1962 
BBWA 18 27 55 
Barclays Bank DCO 10 22 57 
British & French Bank (later UBA) 1 2 11 
National Bank of Nigeria 9 20 31 
Merchants Bank - 1 failed? 
Agbonmagde Bank 3 3 9 
African Continental Bank 10 14 21 
Nigerian Farmers and Commercial Bank 28 failed failed 
Standard 7 failed failed 
Bank of the North - - 5 
Banque de l'Afrique Occidentale - - 2 
Berini - - 1 
Bank of Lagos - - 1 
Muslim Bank - - 1 
Bank of America - - 1 
Chase Manhattan - - 1 
Co-operative East - - 3 
Co-operative West - - 4 
Total 86 (51) * 89 204 
* In brackets offices of the banks surviving the crash of indigenous banking 1952. 
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